Moral Relativism and the Feminist Movement

            There was an underlying theme of the dangers of universal definitions of women with emphasis on the dangers of a universal definition of the “third world woman”. This emphasis on the role of context and the dangers of assuming the presence of oppression upon women in developing countries ties well into the Abu-Lughod reading of last week. I took particular interest in the section of the text focusing on “the differential value placed on ‘men’s work’ versus ‘women’s work’.” The importance of contextualizing any analysis of a female population is seen not only in the importance of realizing whether or not oppression is actually present in an environment but in understanding whether or not the generalizations yielded in a study (for the means of developing a theory) are positive based on historical implications and societal norms that come with a given region’s culture. This attitude of the division of labor as a universal negative plays well into the moral relativism outlined in Abu-Lughod’s text of last week. While difficult because of our natural inclination to rely upon ethnocentrism as a way of understanding the female populations abroad, the idea that some completely liberated female body exists anywhere in the world is open to interpretation and not just in the realm of labor and women in the workforce but in every aspect of female societal interaction. Grewal and Kaplan echo the sentiment of the harm that a universal understanding of women can take in mobilizing the state and fundamental groups against the female populace (28). Not only does the practice of a universal understanding of women harbor an image of western imperialism and negatively impact the ultimate goal of the feminist movement, but it keeps the female populace from being able to consecrate any form of solidarity regardless of societal and historical positioning.

            In continuation with the idea of moral relativism as it applies to a given female population, there is the idea of “alternative empathies” as outlined in Pedwell’s text. The idea that social imagination creates an ability to understand “others” which in turn creates a moral understanding becomes exceedingly difficult. If there is no place for universality or broad generalizations without the inclusion of overwhelming contextual support for any given region, can there really be a “moral understanding”? Furthermore, in Kincaid’s text in as it is analyzed in Pedwell’s text, empathy for women is to be understood as inherently positive to a society and aids in combating “negative” feelings. However, how much empathy for women is too much? If feminists are constantly postulating the importance of excessive liberties for women to the purpose of creating “equality” then is it truly a benefit to the feminist movement to emphasize the role of women as the gender of weaknesses needing the most protection?